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Fear of an Undeterrable Other
Fredrick E. Vars*
ABSTRACT
America is presently fighting a war on terror and a war on sex
offenders. In each, the government openly detains hundreds of
individuals not for what they have done, but for what they might
do. Some warn that this greatest restriction on liberty may expand
to other types of people. This Article examines the risk of such
expansion by putting our current wars in historical perspective.
The two main conclusions are: (1) some categories of people
detained in prior periods are not being detained today; and (2) the
risk of expansion is real but lower than previously suggested.
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INTRODUCTION
America is currently fighting at least two “wars”: a war on
terror1 and a war on sex offenders.2 In each, the government has
openly employed indefinite preventive detention, locking up
thousands not for what they have done, but for what they might do.
Commentators warn that this controversial strategy may be
expanded to encompass other types of people.3 For example, the
preventive detention of “suspected terrorists” at Guantanamo could
expand to individuals suspected of other violent crimes.4 How real
is that threat?5
This Article assesses the risk of such “mission creep”6—
specifically, the expansion of indefinite preventive detention
beyond terrorists and sex offenders. As others have observed, the
law in these areas is relatively elastic, so the potential for creep is
real.7 In other words, the risk is not zero. To be more precise, one
needs a theory for when the government engages in indefinite
preventive detention. Such a theory will be more persuasive if it
has explanatory power across time, as well as in multiple
situations, including the wars on terror and sex offenders.
It turns out that neither of these wars is wholly new. The
present war on terror dates back to September 11, 2001. Before
that, the last major attack on American soil was at Pearl Harbor on
1. President Obama has said that the war on terror must end, but pointedly
did not declare it over. Peter Baker, Reviving Debate on Nation’s Security,
Obama Seeks To Narrow Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2013, at A1.
2. See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on
Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2010).
3. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected
Terrorists, and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 728, 749 (2009) [hereinafter Cole,
Out of the Shadows]; ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL
PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 94, 101 (2006).
4. Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 3, at 728.
5. This Article is primarily descriptive, not normative. One exception is
the use of the word “threat” here rather than a neutral word like “possibility.”
Criticisms of sex offender commitment appear in Fredrick E. Vars, Delineating
Sexual Dangerousness, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 855 (2013) [hereinafter Vars,
Dangerousness], and Fredrick E. Vars, Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of
Sex Offenders, 44 CONN. L. REV. 161 (2011) [hereinafter Vars, Rethinking]. For
a critical analysis of both “wars” in an historical perspective, see Eric Janus, The
Preventive State: When Is Prevention of Harm Harmful?, in HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC PROTECTION 316 (Mike Nash & Andy Williams, eds. 2010).
6. Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 3, at 749. The term “mission
creep” generally refers to the expansion of a mission beyond its original
objectives. Jim Hoagland, Prepared for Non-Combat, WASH. POST, Apr. 15,
1993, at A29. My focus is on creep to other categories of people, not on creep
within a category.
7. Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 3; JANUS, supra note 3, at 94, 101.
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December 7, 1941. In fact, the government engaged in widespread,
indefinite preventive detention after both attacks.8 In contrast, the
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 did not result in preventive
detention.9 These three events will frame this Article’s discussion
of national security detentions.
The current wave of sex offender commitment started in 1990;
a previous wave started in the late 1930s.10 Sex offender
commitment is often justified as an extension of mental illness
civil commitment.11 Because these two types of commitment share
a mental defect component, they are considered together in this
Article. Sticking to cases where fear is greatest, the mental illness
example employed in this Article is the 2007 Virginia Tech mass
shooting, which also led to an expansion of preventive detention
authority.
A complete history of even one of these six events is beyond
the scope of this Article. Rather, the goal is to distill the key
factors that contribute to preventive detention. The touchstone is
Fear of an Undeterrable Other.12 Fear is a relatively
straightforward concept, but it is not always correlated with risk.13
Other is a term of art. In this context, it means an identifiable
minority group that is perceived negatively by the majority.14
Undeterrable is used loosely to describe anyone with a defect in
control or other attribute that weakens the normal deterrent effect
of civil and criminal penalties.15 Deterrence is the preferred default
option because, if it works, the government has to incarcerate
fewer people than it would need to preventively detain.16 Although
presented here separately, these three factors can be mutually
reinforcing.
Broad fluctuations in detention practices appear to be driven
mainly by fluctuating levels of fear. The scope of such practices,
8. See infra Parts I.A, I.C. By “indefinite preventive detention,” I mean a
deprivation of liberty of movement premised on a perceived risk and not limited
in duration.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See generally Samuel Jan Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Of
Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders
in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69 (2000); see also infra Parts II.A, II.B.
11. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
12. See JANUS, supra note 3, at 108 (referencing a feeling of being
“threatened by an outsider group”).
13. Vars, Dangerousness, supra note 5, at 878–82.
14. Cf. Natsu Taylor Saito, Interning the “Non-Alien” Other: The Illusory
Protections of Citizenship, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (2005).
15. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 140 (2006).
16. See infra Part III.
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however, is sensitive to then-operative notions of Otherness. Here,
there is some room for optimism, or at least two silver linings to
the current resurgence of preventive detention. Tens of thousands
of Japanese-American citizens were interned during World War
II.17 It appears that only a few American citizens were detained
after 9/11.18 Citizenship trumped ethnic and cultural Otherness.
Less appreciated is the status of homosexuals in the history of sex
offender commitment. Many were detained in the first wave based
on consensual adult sex; very few, if any, in the second.19 Our
culture no longer views lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
people as a sufficiently threatening Other to detain preventively.
Muslim and Arab-American citizens and homosexuals should
probably be thankful that they do not live in an earlier era.
Should we nonetheless be worried about mission creep? That
post-9/11 detentions focused almost exclusively on non-citizens is
hopeful.20 A terror attack would likely have to be larger than 9/11
to lead to widespread detentions of citizens. The more likely threat
is fear induced by a domestic crime wave or even a few horrific
crimes, as in the case of sex offenders. Sex offenders have been
called the most reviled Other.21 That kind of antipathy, thankfully,
does not materialize overnight. But other categories of dangerous
people may still be at risk. Fear of an undeterrable Other is not
presently sufficient to justify overt indefinite detention of gang
members, for example. But such a conclusion is historically
contingent and could change with rapid gang expansion and
increased gang violence.22
Because the primary driver is fear, Part I outlines three moments
in history when national security was in peril: (1) the attack on Pearl
Harbor, (2) the Oklahoma City bombing, and (3) 9/11. The first and
third engendered large-scale, indefinite preventive detention. In
both, there was fear of an undeterrable Other. This was not the case
after Oklahoma City. Part II examines two types of out-of-control
criminals: (1) sex offenders and (2) some individuals with mental
illness. Undeterrability is thought to distinguish them from other
dangerous people. And, when combined with frightening crimes,
the government has repeatedly authorized the indefinite preventive
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. See infra Part II.
20. Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in
Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273, 297 (2003).
21. See infra note 114 and accompanying text (noting that Hoover called
sex offenses the “most loathsome of all the vast army of crime”).
22. Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, 32
J. L. MED. & ETHICS 56, 65 (2004).
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detention of these two types of individuals. Part III integrates the
first two sections to answer the central question about mission
creep, concluding that it is possible but perhaps less likely than
others have suggested. At least one of the critical requirements of
fear, undeterrability, and Otherness is missing in the most currently
plausible candidates for expanded preventive detention.
I. NATIONAL SECURITY
A. World War II
On the morning of December 7, 1941, hundreds of Japanese
aircraft surprise-attacked the American military base at Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii.23 Over a dozen ships and over three hundred
aircraft were sunk, damaged, or destroyed. In addition, 2,402
Americans were killed and 1,247 wounded.24 Over 97% of the
dead and wounded were members of the military.25
That night, the FBI took into custody those whom it deemed to
be the most dangerous German, Italian, and Japanese citizens.
“Over the next several months, the FBI detained 9,121 enemy
aliens in this manner. Approximately 5,100 (57 percent) were
Japanese nationals, 3,250 (36 percent) were German nationals, and
650 (7 percent) were Italian nationals.”26 Individualized hearings
led to the release of more than half of these detainees by June 30,
1943.27
But preventive detention did not stop there. On February 19,
1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9066,
which in vague terms authorized the exclusion of “any persons”
from military areas. Over the next eight months, under the
direction of West Coast Commander General John DeWitt, almost
120,000 persons of Japanese descent were ordered to leave their
homes in California, Washington, Oregon, and Arizona. Twothirds of those forcibly relocated into internment camps were

23. Attack on Pearl Harbor, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor, archived at http://perma.cc/GJ65-DS36 (last updated Aug.
14, 2014) (citing PATRICK WATSON, WATSON’S REALLY BIG WWII ALMANAC,
VOLUME II: JULY TO DECEMBER 592 (2007)). See generally WALTER LORD, DAY OF
INFAMY (1957).
24. Attack on Pearl Harbor, supra note 23; LORD, supra note 23.
25. Attack on Pearl Harbor, supra note 23; LORD, supra note 23.
26. GEOFFREY R. STONE, WAR AND LIBERTY: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA:
1790 TO THE PRESENT 65 (2007) [hereinafter STONE, WAR AND LIBERTY].
27. Id. at 66.
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American citizens.28 This exclusion persisted until December 17,
1944.29
Why did this happen? The official justification in 1942 was
that there was no quick way to distinguish loyal from disloyal
Japanese.30 The United States Supreme Court accepted this
justification in upholding the internment.31 However, official
thinking has since changed. In 1982, a Congressional commission
concluded:
The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was not
justified by military necessity, and the decisions which
followed from it—detention, ending detention and ending
exclusion—were not driven by analysis of military
conditions. The broad historical causes which shaped these
decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of
political leadership.32
The Japanese internment supports this Article’s thesis that the
government engages in indefinite preventive detention in response
to fear of an undeterrable Other. Fear of an Other is obviously
consistent with the modern view that internment was driven by
“race prejudice” and “war hysteria.” Undeterrability is implicit in
the contemporaneous rationale of disloyalty: the threat of sanctions
could not deter a loyal subject of Japan if the subject had been
called upon to assist its war effort.
Fear. After Pearl Harbor, fear of a Japanese attack on the West
Coast was intense.33 Japanese forces quickly compiled a string of
surprising victories against the U.S. and its allies. In January 1942,
Congressman Homer Angell of Oregon warned: “We must wake
up, and if we do not wake up and protect ourselves from this

28. Id.
29. Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians, in PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED ch. 8 (1982) [hereinafter Commission
Report], available at http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/personal
_justice_denied/contents.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/VRH9-KAGV.
30. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1944).
31. Id. at 214. See David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial
Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2568–
69 (2003) [hereinafter Cole, Judging the Next Emergency] (citing Korematsu as
evidence that “courts are ineffective as guardians of liberty when the general
public is clamoring for security”). Justice Scalia agrees. See Audrey McAvoy,
Scalia Says Internment Ruling Could Happen Again, AP (Feb. 3, 2014, 8:06
PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/scalia-says-internment-ruling-could-happenagain, archived at http://perma.cc/VUC6-6FKR.
32. Commission Report, supra note 29, at 5, 8, 67–68.
33. Id.
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menace something infinitely worse than Pearl Harbor will be
enacted on our very shores.”34 Fear motivated the internment.35
Other. The Japanese were an identifiable and widely reviled
Other. In January 1942, General DeWitt stated, “The Japanese race
is an enemy race and while many second and third generation
Japanese were born on United States soil, possessed of United
States citizenship, have become ‘Americanized,’ the racial strains
are undiluted.”36 On another occasion, DeWitt infamously
proclaimed, “[A] Jap’s a Jap.”37
Undeterrable. The content of the anti-Japanese stereotypes fed
the perception that preventive detention was necessary. These
stereotypes ran deep, bleeding over from earlier prejudice against
the Chinese “yellow peril.”38 Both the Chinese and Japanese were
viewed as “treacherous” and loyal only to their home countries.39
After sweeping Japanese victories against Russia, a San Francisco
paper in 1905 warned that Japanese “uncontrollable ambitions”
threatened California.40
Pearl Harbor fanned a burning flame of racial distrust.
California State Senator Jack Metzger stated in February 1942: “I
don’t believe there is a single Japanese in the world who is not
pulling for Japan. They will spy, commit sabotage, or die if
necessary.”41 California Attorney General Earl Warren warned of
the “broad control” Japan had over all ethnic Japanese in
America.42 One commentator explained: “A Japanese-American
citizen in 1942 was easily considered ‘foreign,’ thus making
possible the judgment that likelihood of disloyalty was high
enough to justify wholesale internment.”43
34. JACOBUS TENBROEK, EDWARD N. BARNHART, & FLOYD W. MATSON,
PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 78 (1954).
35. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME,
FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 290 (2004)
[hereinafter STONE, PERILOUS TIMES] (“Certainly, this demand [for removal of
all Japanese] was fed by fears of a large-scale Japanese invasion of the
mainland.”); Meaghan Kelly, Note, Lock Them Up—and Throw Away the Key:
The Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders in the United States and Germany,
39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 551, 553 (2008) (stating that fear led to the Japanese
internment).
36. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES, supra note 35, at 292.
37. Id.
38. TENBROEK ET AL., supra note 34, at 19.
39. Id. at 20, 24, 67.
40. Id. at 26.
41. Id. at 77.
42. Id. at 84.
43. Saito, supra note 14, at 183 (2005) (quoting Neil Gotanda, “Other NonWhites” in American Legal History: A Review of Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1186, 1191 (1985) (reviewing PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983))). See
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In sum, fear of an undeterrable Other motivated the Japanese
internment.
B. Oklahoma City Bombing
On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh detonated an explosivefilled truck next to a federal building in Oklahoma City.44 In all,
168 people were killed; over 680 were injured.45 At his trial, the
prosecution claimed that McVeigh was “motivated by hatred of the
government” and was “in a rage over the events at Waco,” where
two years to the day before the bombing a federal raid produced 76
civilian casualties.46 McVeigh was not a member of any militia
group, but he had previously attended a militia meeting.47
Even before the bombing, some militia members believed that
the federal government was building concentration camps to
incarcerate citizens,48 but this assumption did not turn out to be
true. Rather, the primary policy response to the bombing was the
enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996.49 This Act narrowed habeas corpus and broadened some
criminal restrictions, but it did not authorize or expand preventive
detention in any way.50
There were obviously complicated politics at work, but the
government’s failure to engage in large-scale, indefinite preventive
detention after the Oklahoma City bombing should not be
surprising. Fear of an undeterrable Other was lacking, though fear
also DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 97 (2003) [hereinafter COLE, ENEMY
ALIENS].
44. See Oklahoma City Bombing, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Oklahoma_City_bombing, archived at http://perma.cc/7879-28U6 (last updated
Sept. 2, 2014).
45. Id.
46. Excerpts from Closing Arguments in the Oklahoma City Bombing Case,
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1997, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/1997/05/30/us/excerpts-from-closing-arguments-in-the-oklahoma-city-bombing
-case.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7JGR-V6QK.
47. Richard Leiby, Many Militia Groups Scale Back, Distance Themselves
from McVeigh, WASH. POST, June 14, 1997, at A08.
48. Kevin Mayhood, Ohio Had Eye on Radical Militia Members Before
Bombing, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), May 2, 1995, at 01A.
49. Oklahoma City Bombing, supra note 44. See also Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
50. To the extent the Act targeted terrorism, it was international rather than
domestic. Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and
United States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2844
(2001). This is further support, though indirect, for my “Otherness” requirement.
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of terrorist attacks was no doubt elevated after the bombing. A
week after the attack, 42% of Americans in one survey were very
or somewhat worried that they or someone in their family would
become a victim of a terrorist attack.51
The deeply held beliefs of militia members might be viewed
similarly to one’s loyalty to a home country or radical religious
precepts. In other words, militia members may be undeterrable, but
they are not an Other. For example, a letter to the editor of a local
paper dismissed calls for post-9/11 internment camps as reflecting
“war hysteria and racism aimed against foreigners”:
After all, when Timothy McVeigh bombed an Oklahoma
City federal building in 1995, did anyone . . . suggest that
the militia-oriented citizenry should be forcibly detained in
camps? Heaven forbid we should imprison anyone
affiliated with right-wing militia groups. They may be
armed to the teeth, but at least they’re God-fearing white
Americans!52
The response to the Oklahoma City bombing was to increase
the bite of criminal sanctions, not to employ preventive detention.
There was insufficient fear of an undeterrable Other. Despite his
extreme beliefs, Timothy McVeigh was not an Other, because he
was a “God-fearing white American.” Being a white citizen was
obviously important, but so too may have been the type of God
that he feared. He was raised Roman Catholic, though he later selfidentified as agnostic.53 Significantly, he was not Muslim.54
C. “War on Terror”
On the morning of September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four
civilian aircraft and crashed them into the World Trade Center, the
Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania.55 Overall, 2,982 people
51. Americans’ Fear of Terrorism in U.S. Is Near Low Point, GALLUP
(Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/149315/americans-fear-terrorismnear-low-point.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/6QHL-8G4C [hereinafter
GALLUP POLL]. The comparable figure after 9/11 was 59%. See id.
52. Doris Mah, Internment Camps Are Wrong and Illegal, LANCASTER
INTELLIGENCER J., Oct. 4, 2001, at A-15.
53. Timothy McVeigh, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timothy
_McVeigh#Political_views_and_religious_beliefs, archived at http://perma.cc/L8TXK8JK (last updated Aug. 26, 2014).
54. Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective
Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429 (2011-2012).
55. September 11 Attacks, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Septem
ber_11_attacks, archived at http://perma.cc/X3KL-Y74J (last updated Sept. 1,
2014).
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died.56 The casualties were overwhelmingly civilian, but included
125 Pentagon employees.57 The hijackers were Muslim, members
of al-Qaeda, and 15 were of Saudi Arabian origin.58 None were
U.S. citizens.59
The government immediately began detaining people under a
variety of authorities. The greatest number of such detentions
involved the immigration system.60 The federal government, using
immigration law as justification, preventively detained more than
5,000 foreign nationals, nearly all Arab or Muslim, in the first two
years after 9/11.61 Immigration detentions are, at least in theory,
temporary.62 Noncitizens have been detained indefinitely,
however, at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Of 779
total detainees, 223 remained by late September 2009.63 As of
March 2013, 166 detainees remained.64
The detentions of three American citizens received a great deal
of media and legal attention.65 John Walker Lindh and Yaser Esam
Hamdi were captured in Afghanistan.66 Lindh soon appeared in
civilian criminal court and eventually pled guilty.67 Hamdi was
placed in a naval brig in Virginia, incommunicado for nearly three
years.68 He was removed to Saudi Arabia only after successfully
challenging his confinement before the United States Supreme
56. Id.
57. STEVEN STRASSER & CRAIG R. WHITNEY, THE 9/11 INVESTIGATIONS
392–93 (Steven Strasser ed., 2004).
58. September 11 Attacks, supra note 55.
59. Id.
60. Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American
Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 85, 147–48 (2011).
61. Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 3, at 703.
62. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
63. David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the
Law of War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 1021 (2009).
64. Peter Finn & Julie Tate, Guantanamo Detainees’ Frustrations
Simmering, Lawyers and Others Say, WASH. POST. (Mar. 16, 2013) http://www
.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/guantanamo-detainees-frustrations
-simmering-lawyers-and-others-say/2013/03/16/47fc4c0e-8d9a-11e2-b63f-53
fb9f2fcb4 story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/V9JS-SW4Z. “Congress
responded to the 2001 [Supreme Court case holding that immigration detentions
must be temporary] with the USA PATRIOT Act language establishing a
process for long-term detention of suspected alien terrorists who cannot be
deported—provisions that have yet to face judicial test.” Klein & Wittes, supra
note 60, at 150.
65. At least seven other citizens were detained as material witnesses. COLE,
ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 43, at 39.
66. Saito, supra note 14, at 203.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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Court.69 A third citizen, Jose Padilla, was first detained for a
prolonged period, then convicted in civilian criminal court.70
Preventive detention in the “War on Terror,” as during World
War II, has been driven by fear of an undeterrable Other.
Fear. The Secretary of Defense minced no words justifying the
Guantanamo Bay detentions on fear, describing the prisoners as
“among the most dangerous, best-trained, vicious killers on the
face of the earth.”71 In his 2002 State of the Union Address,
President George W. Bush spoke of “unprecedented dangers” and
warned that tens of thousands of terrorists spread throughout the
world were “like ticking time bombs - set to go off without
warning.”72 The public shared these fears. Before 9/11, about a
quarter of Americans felt very or somewhat worried that they or a
family member could become a victim of terrorism; shortly after
9/11, that number was 59%.73 Nearly 90% of Americans post-9/11
thought another terrorist attack within a few months was likely.74
Other. There is no question that the government overwhelmingly
targeted noncitizen Arabs and Muslims for preventive detention.
Muslim Americans—citizens and noncitizens—are Others. Indeed,
one set of researchers contends that Muslims are uniquely, doubly
Other, classified in the cultural, racial, and ethnic outgroups.75 A
survey in 2004 put Muslims just above 50 on a “temperature-offeeling” scale, as compared with a mid-70s score for Whites and
high 60s for Blacks, Catholics, Jews, Asian-Americans, and
Hispanic-Americans.76 Whites considered Muslims more violent
and less trustworthy than any other group.77 These negative
stereotypes have been found to be significantly associated with an
increased willingness to sacrifice civil liberties for security.78
69. Saito, supra note 14, at 203–06.
70. Kirk Semple, Padilla Gets 17-Year Term for Role in Conspiracy, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2008, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01
/23/us/23padilla.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/TX9T-DUH7.
71. Glazier, supra note 63, at 1019.
72. Editorial, A War Speech, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2002, at
C10.
73. GALLUP POLL, supra note 51.
74. Brigitte L. Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, & Robert Y. Shapiro, Post-9/11
Terrorism Threats, News Coverage, and Public Perceptions in the United
States, 1 INT’L J. CONFLICT & VIOLENCE 105, 114 (2007).
75. See generally Kerem Ozan Kalkan, Geoffrey C. Layman, & Eric M.
Uslaner, “Bands of Others”? Attitudes Toward Muslims in Contemporary
American Society, 71 J. POL. 847 (2009).
76. John Sides & Kimberly Gross, Stereotypes of Muslims and Support for
the War on Terror, J. POL. fig.1 (forthcoming), available at http://home
.gwu.edu/~jsides/muslims.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/C35E-LWBZ.
77. Id. fig.2.
78. Id. at 17.
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Illegal immigrants scored even lower than Muslims on the
aforementioned temperature scale (high 30s)—indeed, the lowest
of any group.79 In one study conducted a year after 9/11, college
students in the U.S.–Mexico border area felt a greater symbolic
threat concerning Arab immigrants as compared to the much more
numerous Mexican immigrants.80 “Arab immigrants were viewed
with more negative affect (greater prejudice) and were perceived to
represent a greater threat to the cultural milieu of the U.S.”81
Japanese Americans after Pearl Harbor were deemed “foreign”
enough to intern as Others, but Muslim Americans after 9/11 were
(properly) not.82
Terrorists themselves are plainly Other, described as
“predator[s],” “inherently malevolent,” “savage[s],” “beast[s],”
“parasite[s],” and “evil and inhuman.”83 One scholar noted:
At its most basic level, this discursive construction of the
depersonalized and dehumanized ‘enemy other’ can be
seen in the commonly used derogatory terms that soldiers
of every generation have employed. ‘Hun’, ‘Japs’, ‘gooks’,
‘rag-heads’ and ‘skinnies’ are the means by which fellow
human beings—who are also husbands, sons, brothers,
friends—are discursively transformed into a hateful and
loathsome ‘other’ who can be killed and abused without
remorse or regret.84
Terrorists were quickly added to this list as one of the most hated
Others.
Undeterrable. The strongest evidence that terrorists were
undeterrable came from the fact that the hijackers on 9/11
committed suicide as part of the attack. Our strongest sanction—

79. Id. fig.1.
80. Robert T. Hitlan, Kimberly Carrillo, Michael A. Zárate, & Shelley N.
Aikman, Attitudes Toward Immigrant Groups and the September 11 Terrorist
Attacks, 13 PEACE & CONFLICT: J. PEACE PSYCH. 135, 149 (2007).
81. Id. at 144.
82. See Gotanda, supra note 43, at 1188 (“One of the critical features of
legal treatment of Other non-Whites has been the inclusion of a notion of
‘foreignness’ in considering their racial identity and legal status.”); COLE,
ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 43, at 97 (“The close interrelationship between antiAsian racism and anti-immigrant sentiment made the transition from enemy
alien to enemy race disturbingly smooth.”).
83. Joseph Margulies, Deviance, Risk, and Law: Reflections on the Demand
for the Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 729, 766 (2011).
84. Id. at 768 (quoting RICHARD JACKSON, WRITING THE WAR ON
TERRORISM: LANGUAGE, POLITICS, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 60 (2005)).
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the death penalty—is no deterrent to a suicide bomber.85 This may
be one reason the terrorists were branded as “inherently malevolent
. . . beasts.”86 Once the terrorists were dehumanized in this way,
they were viewed as irredeemable.
The government did not detain only known terrorists, but also
suspected terrorists. That included the temporary detention of
literally thousands of Arab and Muslim noncitizens.87 One
explanation is that the stereotypes discussed above—that Muslims
are more violent and less trustworthy than other groups—suggest
that they may be resistant to deterrence. More to the point, one
survey found that 43% of Americans thought Muslims were
fanatic.88 But the connection is tighter than that. Even before 9/11,
42% of respondents in one survey agreed with the statement that
“Muslims belong to a religion that condones or supports
terrorism.”89 Echoing much earlier anti-Japanese sentiment, a 1993
anti-immigration publication warned against “Arab-born aliens
who support terrorist activity and remain loyal to Middle East
tyrants.”90
II. MENTAL DEFECT
Over two periods in American history, thousands of sex
offenders have been detained for indeterminate terms. The stated
justifications for such detentions have been prevention—as with
the Japanese, Arabs, and Muslims—and also treatment.91 At least
in the current phase, “the notion that the sex offenders are being
medically ‘treated’ as part of this program is largely a fiction.”92
Treatment, even when sincerely pursued, is usually ineffective.93
85. Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the Primary Goal of Sentencing:
The Modern Case for Indeterminate Dispositions in Criminal Cases, 48 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1127, 1142 (2011).
86. Margulies, supra note 83, at 766.
87. Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 3, at 703.
88. Madalla A. Alibeli & Abdulfattah Yaghi, Theories of Prejudice and
Attitudes Toward Muslims in the United States, 2 INT’L J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI.
21, 25 (2012).
89. JACK G. SHAHEEN, ARAB AND MUSLIM STEREOTYPING IN AMERICAN
POPULAR CULTURE 2–3 (1997).
90. Id. at 8. “Also, about 17 percent of Americans supported the idea of
locking up Muslims just in case they are planning a terrorist attack.” Alibeli &
Yaghi, supra note 88, at 25 (referencing a 2006 survey).
91. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351–52 (1997).
92. Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventive
Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 983 (2011) [hereinafter Yung,
Sex Offender Exceptionalism].
93. Vars, Dangerousness, supra note 5, at 857 n.14.
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Perhaps as a result, very few sex offenders are ever released,94
leaving prevention as the primary, and perhaps only genuine,
justification. Hence, sex offender commitment amounts to
indefinite preventive detention, like the national security detentions
discussed above. The driving force—fear of an undeterrable
Other—is also the same.
Defenders of sex offender commitment claim that it is a modest
expansion of traditional mental illness commitment.95 Such
commitments require dangerousness in addition to mental illness.96
This is a more complicated case because treatment generally is a
valid, required, and perhaps primary motivation for commitment.97
In other words, mental illness civil commitment is not pure
preventive detention—it has a genuine therapeutic component. Due
largely to better treatment and massive contraction in available
beds, the duration of civil commitments, and hence daily census,
has declined substantially since the 1950s.98 The modest changes
to Virginia law described below should be viewed against this
larger context.
A. First-Generation Sex Offender Laws
In the late 1930s, states began adopting what amounted to
alternative, indeterminate sentencing programs for certain sex
offenders.99 The consensus view of historians is that intense media
coverage of “a series of brutal and apparently sexually motivated
child murders” precipitated the first generation of sex offender
94. See John L. Schwab, Note, Due Process and “The Worst of the Worst”:
Mental Competence in Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment
Proceedings, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 912, 917 (2012) (“Of the over 3,000
individuals detained as SVPs since 1990, just fifty have been released because
medical professionals deemed them mentally stable and nondangerous enough
to re-enter society.”).
95. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
96. BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT 2 (2005).
97. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (stating
that for mental illness civil commitment, “[a]dequate and effective treatment is
constitutionally required”); Paul S. Appelbaum, A History of Civil Commitment
and Related Reforms in the United States: Lessons for Today, 25 DEV. MENTAL
HEALTH L. 13 (2006) (arguing that need for treatment continues to guide civil
commitment decisions despite statutory reform).
98. JOHN Q. LA FOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE
FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 87, 144–
45 (1992).
99. John Q. La Fond, Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law: A
Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 655, 659–60 (1992).
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commitment laws.100 However, it may not have been quite this
simple. One pair of researchers found that adopting states were
predominantly urban and had recently experienced the greatest
influx of African Americans.101 As discussed below, however,
these alternative narratives also draw upon fear.
Some states started with rather narrow programs, but the
overall scope became very broad. For example, California first
targeted just child molesters, but then expanded its program to
basically all crimes involving sexual activity.102 California’s
program became the “most extensively utilized program,”
confining approximately 1,000 people each year from 1949 to
1980.103 By the late 1960s, well over half of the states had adopted
such laws, but only a handful retained them by 1990.104
Most laws were broad but not mandatory, so only a subset of those
eligible were actually detained. “In Minnesota [between 1940 and
1960], for example, the typical commitments were for nonviolent
behavior such as window peeping, indecent exposure, and consenting
adult homosexuality, with three-quarters of the individuals being firsttime offenders.”105 Consensual homosexuality was the predicate for
detention of over seven percent of persons detained in Nebraska
between 1949 and 1956.106 Four out of the first 100 cases studied at
the New Jersey diagnostic center under a new sexual psychopath
law were “fixed homosexual deviates.”107 In another jurisdiction,
100. Estelle B. Freedman, “Uncontrolled Desires”: The Response to the
Sexual Psychopath, 1920–1960, 74 J. AM. HIST. 83, 92 (1987).
101. John F. Gallihar & Cheryl Tyree, Edwin Sutherland’s Research on the
Origins of Sexual Psychopath Laws, 33 SOC. PROBS. 100, 109–10 (1985).
102. Roxanne Lieb, Vernon Quinsey, & Lucy Berliner, Sexual Predators and
Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43, 64 (1998).
103. Id. at 63–64.
104. La Fond, supra note 99, at 660–61.
105. Lieb, Quinsey, & Berliner, supra note 102, at 59. See also MORRIS
PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 229 (1951) (“Because of the vagueness of the
statutes, the sex-psychopath laws have been used primarily against minor sex
offenders and in considerable degree have not been employed to isolate
dangerous sex criminals.”); PAUL W. TAPPAN, THE HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMISSION ON THE HABITUAL SEX
OFFENDER (1950). Compare Freedman, supra note 100, at 102 (“[M]en
diagnosed as psychopaths were more likely to be accused of pedophilia and
homosexuality than of rape or murder.”), with Group for the Advancement of
Psychiatry, Psychiatry and Sex Psychopath Legislation: The 30s to the 80s, Vol.
IX, Pub. No. 98, p. 831, 842 (Apr. 1977) (“Less threatening acts of a sexually
deviant or dysfunctional nature (e.g., homosexuality between consenting adults,
exhibitionism, and voyeurism) are usually not included.”).
106. Domenico Caporale & Deryl F. Hamann, Sexual Psychopathy—A Legal
Labyrinth of Medicine, Moral and Mythology, 36 NEB. L. REV. 320, 325 tbl.1
(1957).
107. TAPPAN, supra note 105, at 26.
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one of the first 14 cases adjudicated involved a “non-aggressive
homosexual, convicted of passing bad checks.”108 In Minnesota,
“[m]ost were detained for homosexual activity, not for being hardcore sex criminals.”109
Fear. In 1937, J. Edgar Hoover warned that the “sex fiend” had
become a “sinister threat to the safety of American childhood and
womanhood.”110 The fears that drove the first “sex crime panic”
were both specific and general.111 Individual acts of sexual
brutality, once publicized, led to demands for clamping down on
sex crimes.112 Brutality is frightening enough, but at this moment
in history, it activated other, deeper anxieties.
As mentioned above, highly urbanized states tended to adopt
sexual psychopath legislation. Closer proximity to other people meant
more opportunity for victimization. Growing populations of another
minority group—African Americans—were also correlated with sex
offender commitment. Even more broadly, some have argued that the
Cold War labeled nonconformity, including sexual nonconformity and
homosexuality, as a threat to national security.113
Other. Sex offenders were—and are—perceived as less than
human. J. Edgar Hoover described the “sex fiend” as the “most
loathsome of all the vast army of crime.”114 In affirming its first
generation sexual psychopath law, the Minnesota Supreme Court
described covered sex offenders as “unnaturals,” “hopelessly
108. Id. at 28. See also Preliminary Report of the Subcommittee on Sex
Crimes of the Assembly Interim Committee on Judicial System and Judicial
Process (Cal. 1949) (Statement of Dr. Eugene Ziskind) (“For this group, namely
the constitutional homosexuals, the Sex Psychopath Act should be revised in
keeping with the more scientific and tolerant attitudes existing in other
countries.”). Sexual psychopath commitment was by no means the only method
used to penalize homosexuality: 9% of felony sex convictions in New York
County from 1932–1938 were for homosexuality. Jack Frosch & Walter
Bromberg, The Sex Offender—A Psychiatric Study, 9 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
761 (1939). However, in Los Angeles in the early 1960s, less than 1% of felony
convictions for consensual homosexuality resulted in commitment. The
Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement
and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 UCLA L. REV. 643, 767 tbl.a,
780 n.63 (1966).
109. NEIL MILLER, SEX-CRIME PANIC: A JOURNEY TO THE PARANOID HEART
OF THE 1950S 82 (2002).
110. Frosch & Bromberg, supra note 108, at 761 (quoting “War on the Sex
Criminal”).
111. Steven R. Morrison, Creating Sex Offender Registries: The Religious
Right and the Failure To Protect Society’s Vulnerable, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 23,
46 (2007); Freedman, supra note 100, at 92.
112. Freedman, supra note 100, at 92.
113. Morrison, supra note 111, at 47; Freedman, supra note 100, at 97.
114. Frosch & Bromberg, supra note 108, at 761.
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immoral,” and “insane.”115 Such language obviously included such
“outsider figures” as would be recognized today as “fiends and
psychopaths, pedophiles and predators.”116 But it also included
homosexuals: prior to the 1950s, the popular perception of the
homosexual was “the pathological, predatory, sexually violent
deviant.”117
Undeterrable. Sex offenders were seen to be out of control.
Recall that the Minnesota Supreme Court described sex offenders
subject to detention not just as “immoral,” but “hopelessly” so.118
This lack of control, and hence undeterrability, was a defining
attribute of those subject to detention. “Almost every state included
the phrase ‘utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses.’”119
The first wave of sex offender commitment falls squarely
within the paradigm derived from the national security context:
overt large-scale, indefinite preventive detention in response to
fear of an undeterrable Other.
B. Second-Generation Sex Offender Laws
On May 20, 1989, a young boy in Tacoma, Washington, was
the victim of a brutal sexual attack by a man with a history of
killing, assaulting, and kidnapping.120 The current phase of sex
offender commitment began one year later with Washington’s
“sexually violent predator” (SVP) act.121 This phase differed from
the first by permitting detention after defendants had served time
for the predicate offenses.122
At least twenty states and the federal government have SVP
laws.123 The Kansas statute is typical. It defines a “sexually violent
predator” as “any person who has been convicted of or charged
with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely
to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence.”124
115. State ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Ct., 287 N.W. 297, 299, 301, 303 (Minn.
1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
116. PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD
MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 236 (1998).
117. Michael A. Smyth, Queers and Provocateurs: Hegemony, Ideology, and
the “Homosexual Advance” Defense, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 903, 904 (2006).
118. Pearson, 287 N.W. at 301.
119. Freedman, supra note 100, at 84 n.2.
120. See generally David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in
the Word, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 525 (1992).
121. Id.
122. Vars, Dangerousness, supra note 5, at 857.
123. Schwab, supra note 94, at 916–17.
124. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (West 2014).
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This definition withstood constitutional challenge in the United
States Supreme Court case of Kansas v. Hendricks.125 Five years
later the Court clarified that “there must be proof of serious
difficulty in controlling behavior.”126 A key statutory term is
“sexually violent offense,” which runs the gamut from rape127 to
“any act which . . . has been determined beyond a reasonable doubt
to have been sexually motivated.”128 Notably, Kansas still purports
to criminalize same-sex adult sodomy,129 but that is not separately
listed as a “sexually violent offense” for purposes of the SVP law.
Thousands of individuals have been detained under SVP
laws.130 Looking just at Minnesota, it appears that current
detainees have many more prior offenses than first generation
detainees. During the first generation in Minnesota, three-quarters
of detainees were first-time offenders.131 In the current wave, the
number is flipped: three-quarters of civilly committed sex
offenders had two or more felony convictions.132
Few, if any, individuals have been detained pursuant to a
current SVP law for having participated in consensual adult
homosexual activity. Only four states were enforcing anti-sodomy
laws against homosexuals in 2003 when the United States Supreme
Court declared such laws unconstitutional.133 Kansas was one such
state. There are 127 Kansas cases that contain the phrase “sexually
violent predator.” Of these, only six also include the words
“homosexual” or “homosexuality.”134
In the first case, homosexual activity was cited by an expert,
but there were also convictions for aggravated—underage or
nonconsensual—criminal sodomy.135 The second and third cases

125. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
126. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
127. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(e)(1) (West 2014).
128. Id. § 59-29a02(e)(13).
129. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5504(a)(1) (West 2014).
130. Vars, Dangerousness, supra note 5, at 857 n.12.
131. Lieb, Quinsey, & Berliner, supra note 102, at 59.
132. STATE OF MINN., OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, EVALUATION
REPORT: CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS 7 fig.1.2 (Mar. 2011).
133. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
134. The results described in the text come from a Westlaw search of all
Kansas state law cases.
135. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5504(b) (West 2014); In re Patterson, No.
107,232, 2013 WL 2395313, at *1, *12 (Kan. Ct. App. May 24, 2013) (per
curiam).
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involved aggravated incest.136 The fourth case involved
registration, not commitment.137
The last two cases are telling. The respondent in one
complained that repeated references to his “homosexuality” were
improper because homosexuality is not a mental abnormality or
personality disorder.138 The court rejected this argument not as
stated but on the ground that the respondent admitted to being
bisexual—which was consistent with the testimony and found by
the lower court—so the court did not rely on his homosexual
orientation.139 His homosexual acts, as opposed to orientation,
were properly considered in evaluating the respondent’s risk to
both sexes.140 In the final case, the court rejected commitment
precisely because “it appear[ed] that the two instances of
homosexual activity being referred to d[id] not support the position
that he ha[d] sexually reoffended with a child.”141 In reversing, the
Kansas Supreme Court emphasized that some of the activity
involved an underage individual, although not a child.142
Homosexuality was not cited as a risk factor.143
In sum, during the first wave in Nebraska, homosexuality was
the predicate for detention in over seven percent of cases.144
During the second wave just across the border in Kansas, an
admittedly non-scientific review of case law found not a single
case in which homosexuality was a predicate for detention. More
broadly, one commentator concluded that during the second wave
of sex offender commitment, unlike the first, “[m]ental hospitals
[were] not used as warehouses for homosexuals.”145
Fear. Sex offender commitment laws were adopted almost
uniformly in direct response to brutal and highly salient sex

136. See In re Lowry, 304 P.3d 696, 699 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013); In re Care
and Treatment of Lowry, 277 P.3d 1193 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
137. State v. Coman, 214 P.3d 1198, 1200 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d, 273
P.3d 701 (Kan. 2012).
138. In re Martin, No. 104,826, 2011 WL 4357844, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App.
Sept. 16, 2011).
139. Id.
140. Id. at *5.
141. In re Williams, No. 99,235, 2009 WL 2762455, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App.
Aug. 28, 2009).
142. In re Care and Treatment of Williams, 253 P.3d 327, 337 (Kan. 2011).
143. This is not to say that the fact the victim was male did not influence the
outcome. This Article’s claim is that disparate treatment has been dramatically
reduced, or even eliminated; disparate impact almost certainly remains. Vars,
Rethinking, supra note 5, at 165 n.13.
144. Caporale & Hamann, supra note 106, at 325 tbl.1.
145. MILLER, supra note 109, at 290.
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crimes.146 Fear that such atrocities would be repeated was the
primary catalyst.147 Vivid cases, not statistics, generate fear.148
Other. Sex offenders remain decidedly Other. “It is difficult, if not
impossible, to name a group in the United States that is more reviled
than sex offenders.”149 Sex offenders are viewed as “outsiders” and
“monsters,” “driven by non-human, animal impulses.”150 They have
been described by lawmakers as “the vile and the worthless.”151
Otherness and fear can go hand in hand and connect to terrorism
detentions. Fear of an outsider group is commonly cited as the key
ingredient for sex offender commitment.152 Sex offenders have been
described as “each community’s Osama bin Laden,”153 and regarded
as “domestic terrorists.”154
Undeterrable. It is believed that sex offenders cannot be deterred.
They are not just “monsters”; they are monsters “incapable of making
choices”155 and are “beyond comprehension or reform.”156 Sex
offenders are perceived as “the new lepers: diseased, incurable, unable
to control outbreaks.”157 Dread of these “uncontrollable monsters”
has driven policy again.
C. Virginia Tech Shooting
On April 16, 2007, Seung-Hui Cho shot and killed 33 people,
including himself, and injured about 30 others, on the Virginia
Tech University campus.158 Cho, who had psychiatric problems,
146. JANUS, supra note 3, at 14; Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the
Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 778, 785 (1996).
147. Vars, Dangerousness, supra note 5, at 857–58. Accord JANUS, supra
note 3, at 4 (2006) (referencing “a danger that we all dread”); Stephen J. Morse,
Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 113,
134 (1996) (“public fear”); La Fond, supra note 99, at 675 (“public fear”).
148. La Fond, supra note 99, at 680; JANUS, supra note 3, at 16.
149. Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism, supra note 92, at 988.
150. John Douard, Sex Offender as Scapegoat: The Monstrous Other Within,
53 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 31, 34, 38 (2008–2009).
151. Michael Louis Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants, and
Preventive Detention, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77, 82 (2005).
152. JANUS, supra note 3, at 108; Kelly, supra note 35, at 551.
153. JANUS, supra note 3, at 131 (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Douard, supra note 150, at 38.
155. Id. at 34.
156. Margulies, supra note 83, at 752.
157. Eric S. Janus, The Preventive State, Terrorists and Sexual Predators:
Countering the Threat of a New Outsider Jurisprudence, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 576
(2004) (quoting BARBARA HUDSON, JUSTICE IN THE RISK SOCIETY 66 (2003)).
158. Alison Pfeffer, Note, “Imminent Danger” and Inconsistency: The Need
for National Reform of the “Imminent Danger” Standard for Involuntary Civil

2014]

FEAR OF AN UNDETERRABLE OTHER

21

had previously been found to be an “imminent danger,” but was
ordered into outpatient rather than inpatient treatment.159 In
response to the shooting, Virginia broadened its civil commitment
standards, replacing the “imminent danger” requirement with a
mere “substantial likelihood” of harm requirement.160 The impact
of the change has been “minimal,”161 probably due to space and
budget constraints.162
Still, the government at least attempted to expand indefinite
preventive detention after the Virginia Tech shooting. There was
ample fear and horror at the nature of the crime. Perhaps more
important, the mentally ill are almost a paradigmatic undeterrable
Other. Less susceptible to the force of reason, the mentally ill are
less able to modify their behavior in response to the threat of
criminal sanction.163 They cannot control their illness, and by
definition, it is the source of their dangerousness. In perception at
least, mental illness is quite analogous to sexual deviance.
Although generally not as despised as sex offenders and
terrorists, the mentally ill are an identifiable and devalued minority
group.164 Only 25% of people with mental health symptoms in one
study believed that people were caring and sympathetic toward
persons with mental illness.165 Such feelings are justified: In
another study, 64% of Americans reported that they would be
“definitely” or “probably” unwilling to work closely on the job
with someone who had schizophrenia.166

Commitment in the Wake of the Virginia Tech Tragedy, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
277, 277 n.1 (2008) (citing Ian Shapira & Tom Jackman, Gunman Kills 32 at
Virginia Tech In Deadliest Shooting in U.S. History, WASH. POST, Apr. 17,
2007, at A1).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 278; VA. STAT. ANN. §§ 37.2-808, 37.2-809 (West 2014).
161. Laurence Hammack, Mental Care Mandates See Decline, ROANOKE
TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Apr. 19, 2009, at A1.
162. Parents of Mentally Ill Tell Lawmakers of Difficulties Some Laws
Present, CQ NEWS (Mar. 5, 2013).
163. Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against
Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54, 59,
63 (1982).
164. Joseph M. Livermore, Carl P. Malmquist, & Paul E. Meehl, On the
Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 78 (1968) (“The
common distinguishing factor in civil commitment is aberrance.”).
165. Attitudes Toward Mental Illness --- 35 States, District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico, 2007, CNTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (May 28,
2010),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5920a3.htm,
archived at http://perma.cc/BSQ5-NBL4.
166. BERNICE A. PESCOSOLIDO ET AL., AMERICANS’ VIEWS OF MENTAL
HEALTH AND ILLNESS AT CENTURY’S END: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 31 tbl.11
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Fear of an undeterrable Other—the mentally ill—prompted
expansion of preventive detention authority in Virginia, but did not
lead to a corresponding increase in detentions.167 The most likely
explanation is that there simply were not enough beds available to
accommodate new patients.
III. PROSPECTS FOR EXPANSION
Will the logic of terrorist and sex offender commitment be
expanded to other groups? In the terrorism context, expansion
would mean expansion to citizens, who were interned in large
numbers during World War II but not after 9/11.168 The recipe for
expanded indefinite civil commitment is fear of an undeterrable
Other. Arab and Muslim American citizens are an identifiable and
devalued minority, although less disliked than illegal immigrants.
Many in the majority continue to believe that Islam endorses
fanaticism and terrorism—by implication, Muslims are
undeterrable.169 Their fate would seem to turn largely on fear. That
this group was not widely targeted for preventive detention after
the massive 9/11 attack suggests that fear will have to be very
intense indeed to prompt a change of course.170 It is probably not
going to happen due to mere inattention171 or passive mission
creep.172
Two citizens and two non-citizens recently claimed that they
feared indefinite government detention pursuant to a statute
reaffirming extraordinary post-9/11 powers.173 The Second Circuit

(MacArthur 1996 GSS). It should be noted that Virginia is not alone in
expanding civil commitment criteria in response to public fear. See John
Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among
Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 400, 403 (2006); Glenn
L. Pierce, Mary L. Durham, & William H. Fisher, The Impact of Public Policy
and Publicity on Admissions to State Mental Hospitals, 11 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 41 (1986).
167. See Hammack, supra note 161.
168. Commentators debate whether the War on Terror reflects progress since
the widely discredited Japanese internment. Compare Tushnet, supra note 20,
with Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of the
Japanese Internment in the Post-Hamdi World, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 307 (2006).
169. See supra notes 88, 89, and accompanying text.
170. “[I]f the United States had been hit with six terrorist attacks on the scale
of September 11 within a single month in 2001, who knows what measures we
might have embraced?” STONE, WAR AND LIBERTY, supra note 26, at 171.
171. Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 3, at 749.
172. Id.
173. Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 186–87 (2d Cir. 2013).
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rejected that claim, holding that the statute did not expand
authority to detain citizens.174 Importantly, the court recognized
that there might be such authority, just not based on this statute.175
The court’s ruling with respect to the non-citizens is more
interesting: they lacked standing because, despite arguably falling
within the scope of the statute, “they [had] not established a basis
for concluding that enforcement against them [was] even remotely
likely.”176 Of course, enforcement against non-citizens with closer
ties to terrorism may well be likely enough to establish standing,
but the Second Circuit basically dismissed the threat that
preventive detention would be expanded, even to non-citizens who
had indirectly supported terrorism.177
The first wave of sex offender commitment expressly targeted
homosexuals; the current wave does not.178 Nonetheless, the logic of
sex offender commitment could be expanded to other groups. John La
Fond warned of this potential almost immediately after Washington
adopted the first new-wave SVP law.179 His list of possible targets
includes drunk drivers, domestic abusers, drug users, and gang
members.180 This warning came before the Supreme Court grafted
onto Kansas’s SVP law a control-defect requirement.181 But most
criminals have a control defect, especially those in La Fond’s list.182
Drug users and drunk drivers may well have impaired volition.183
Domestic abusers, like sex offenders, could be viewed as pathological,
not just immoral. And gang members, like the allegedly disloyal
174. Id. at 193.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 202.
177. Id.
178. One commentator concludes that “the sex offender is the new
homosexual.” Joseph J. Fischel, Transcendent Homosexuals and Dangerous Sex
Offenders: Sexual Harm and Freedom in the Judicial Imaginary, 17 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 277, 302 (2010). But that’s not correct: rather, the old
definition of sex offender included homosexuals; the new one does not. The
same commentator, however, nicely summarizes the critical change in
perspective: homosexuals are now considered people, sex offenders are still not.
Id. at 307.
179. La Fond, supra note 99, at 698–99.
180. Id. at 699. For a similar list and concern, see Steven I. Friedland, On
Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 73, 121–22 (1999). As a preliminary matter, there would seem to
be no equality concerns that would push against preventive detention of these
groups, unlike homosexuals and citizens.
181. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
182. JANUS, supra note 3.
183. E.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 671 (1962) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“The addict is under compulsions not capable of management
without outside help.”).
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Japanese of the WWII era, adhere to a code of conduct that may
mitigate the deterrent effect of law. In other words, these criminals
are all arguably undeterrable—not just bad, but mad.184
That leaves Otherness and fear. Drunk drivers almost certainly
fail the Otherness test. Seventeen million Americans admitted to
drunk driving in 2010, including almost a quarter of people aged
21 to 25.185 There is a powerful stigma associated with drunk
driving, but assuming no accident occurs, the stigma is less than
that attributed to drug use.186 Some subset of serious drug users
may therefore be sufficiently Other. And although there is
currently not enough fear to justify preventive detention, that could
change with a new drug or other market shock.187
Domestic abusers, like drunk drivers and drug users, are hard
to identify in advance. Being identifiable, recall, is a prerequisite
for Otherness. That may be why current practice in some
jurisdictions is to preventively detain some domestic abusers after
they have acted but before they are convicted of any crime.188
Gang members, perhaps easier to identify, are treated similarly
when bail is denied, because they are considered dangerous.189 But
the government has at times been even more proactive regarding
gang membership.
Chicago’s 2000 Gang Congregation Ordinance is a good
example. It criminalizes gang loitering, which is defined as
loitering with intent to commit a crime.190 As written, this is
plainly preventive: the goal is to preempt the planned crime.
Almost 3,000 orders to disperse were issued by Chicago police
from 2000 through October 15, 2010, over 97% to blacks or
Hispanics.191 Blacks and Hispanics have historically been viewed
184. Morse, supra note 147, at 134.
185. Statistics, MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, http://www.madd.org
/statistics/, archived at http://perma.cc/V4KN-HXJ3 (last visited Aug. 22, 2013).
186. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Beyond Law Enforcement: Camreta v. Greene, Child
Protection Investigations, and the Need to Reform the Fourth Amendment
Special Needs Doctrine, 87 TUL. L. REV. 353, 419 (2012).
187. Mara Lynn Krongard, Comment, A Population at Risk: Civil
Commitment of Substance Abusers After Kansas v. Hendricks, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
111, 145–47 (2002).
188. See, e.g., Ted Sampsell-Jones, Preventive Detention, Character
Evidence, and the New Criminal Law, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 723, 726 (2010);
Steven J. Mulroy, “Hold” On: The Remarkably Resilient, Constitutionally
Dubious 48-Hour Hold, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815, 817–18, 824 (2013).
189. See K. Babe Howell, Fear Itself: The Impact of Allegations of Gang
Affiliation on Pre-Trial Detention, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 620, 621 (2011).
190. See Jane Penley, Comment, Urban Terrorists: Addressing Chicago’s
Losing Battle with Gang Violence, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 1185, 1192 (2012).
191. Id. at 1200 fig.1, 1201 fig.2.
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as Others; blacks and Hispanics who are members of gangs are
even farther outside the mainstream.
Among La Fond’s list of four groups, gang members would
seem to be the only group sufficiently Other for preventive
detention. The last ingredient is fear. To be sure, people fear gang
members, but probably not in the same way as they fear terrorists
or sex offenders. In 2008, about 5% of violent crime victims could
determine that the offender or offenders were gang members.192 Of
course, many victims do not know and many crimes go unreported.
The FBI estimates that gangs are responsible for approximately
48% of violent crime in most jurisdictions.193 That is a huge
number, which could drive fear through the roof if combined with
an increase in crime rates like the one observed in the 1960s and
1970s.194
In order to drive policy, however, fear must be experienced by
those in power.195 The victims of violent crime are also
disproportionately powerless. From 1980 to 2008, the homicide
victimization rate for blacks was six times higher than the rate for
whites.196 Most murders are intraracial: 84% of white victims were
killed by whites, and 93% of black victims were killed by
blacks.197 The Chicago dispersal order data and these figures
together suggest that at least the most visible gang members tend
to be black and Hispanic and prey upon individuals in the same
groups. That only 22% or so of homicide victims were killed by
strangers probably reduces the level of fear the in-group feels
toward gang members.198
A final important factor weighs against the likelihood of vast
mission creep: cost. It would be infeasible to preventively detain,
192. Gangs, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index
.cfm?ty=tp&tid=36, archived at http://perma.cc/9YWP-DLW7 (last visited Aug.
8, 2013).
193. 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment – Emerging Trends, FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011
-national-gang-threat-assessment, archived at http://perma.cc/K3M4-ACDQ
(last visited Aug. 8, 2013).
194. Alexia Cooper & Erica L. Smith, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-2008 2 fig.1, available at http://www.bjs
.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UR8J-TRUC
(last visited Aug. 6, 2013).
195. Cf. Leo Johnathan Ramos, English First Legislation: Potential National
Origin Discrimination, 11 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 77 (1991) (“Historically, the
English speaking majority reacted to a growing immigrant and language minority
population by allowing xenophobic fears to shape the ‘Americanization’ policy.”).
196. Cooper & Smith, supra note 194, at 3 tbl.1.
197. Id. at 13.
198. Id. at 16.
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even for a relatively short time, every possible drunk driver, drug
user, domestic abuser, or gang member.199 Of course, the
intervention could be limited to the most dangerous, as is true for
sex offender and mental illness commitment. But the steep cost of
incarceration tilts toward freedom. Indeed, it appears to have been
the greatest impediment to large-scale expansion of mental illness
civil commitment in Virginia. The ingredients may be there—at
least after a frightening tragedy like Virginia Tech—but the longterm, cost-saving trend of deinstitutionalization is not easily
reversed.
The high cost of incarceration explains why indefinite
preventive detention has been limited to categories of people
deemed undeterrable. In a perfect world, the threat of enforcement
would eliminate all crime. Society would have to lock up no one.
In our imperfect world, the hope is that locking up one wrongdoer
discourages many others. On the other hand, preventive detention
works only if we can accurately identify individuals who are very
likely to commit crimes. Sex offender commitment relies on some
of the best actuarial instruments, but few, if any, individuals can be
confidently classified as more likely than not to commit an
offense.200 Many—perhaps most—detained sex offenders would
not commit a crime if released. Society is wasting money by
keeping them locked up.
Returning to gang members, this Article earlier suggested that
adherence to a gang code—like being Japanese during World War
II—might be viewed as rendering a member undeterrable. So far,
society appears to disagree.201 The dominant law enforcement
responses to gang violence have been focused on deterrence: more
police202 and stiffer sentences.203 There are even serious efforts at
intervention and rehabilitation.204 Until a jurisdiction believes these
199. Brian J. Pollock, Kansas v. Hendricks: A Workable Standard for
“Mental Illness” or a Push Down the Slippery Slope Toward State Abuse of
Civil Commitment?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 319, 348 (1998).
200. Vars, Rethinking, supra note 5.
201. Cf. Stephanie Smith, Civil Banishment of Gang Members:
Circumventing Criminal Due Process Requirements?, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461,
1478 (2000) (“There is no indication that the gang members are not capable of
being deterred.”).
202. E.g., Jim Guy, Homicide Rate Down Despite Latest Surge, FRESNO BEE,
Dec. 20, 2005, at B2 (“An increased number of officers on the street for gang
enforcement creates more of a deterrent, the [police] chief added.”).
203. 18 U.S.C. § 521 (2012). This mirrors the response to the Oklahoma City
bombing, see supra note 40 and accompanying text. The assumption appears to
have been that militia members, like gang members, are deterrable.
204. Scott H. Decker, Strategies to Address Gang Crime: A Guidebook for Local
Law Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.cops
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measures are futile and fear escalates, it seems unlikely that there
will be overt indefinite preventive detention of gang members.
CONCLUSION
Twice in the national security context and twice with sex
offenders, the United States has preventively detained hundreds. In
the earlier two periods, larger numbers and more types of
individuals were detained: tens of thousands of citizens during
World War II; and hundreds of homosexuals between the 1930s
and 1980s. Against this backdrop, the current wars on terror and
sex offenders seem less egregious. To be sure, they rest on
dangerously elastic legal concepts that could expand to cover other
groups. But the likelihood of such expansion may be somewhat
less than previously suggested.
Large-scale, indefinite preventive detention has historically
taken place in response to fear of an undeterrable Other. Fear will
come and go. Enemies and criminals can be labeled undeterrable.
But the types of people we consider Other may have shrunk as we
became more diverse. When everyone is a minority, no one is.205
The dividing line on terrorism post-9/11 was citizenship. Arab and
Muslim American U.S. citizens were not preventively detained in
large numbers, athough thousands of noncitizens in these groups
were. The progress on sex offender commitment seems all but
irreversible. It is hard to imagine this country again detaining
people merely for being homosexual.206
Will the current preventive detention regimes expand in other
directions? Probably not. It must be conceded that while the
citizenship boundary appears to be robust based on post-9/11
actions, fear of a discrete minority of citizens could become so
pronounced as to erase that line. In all likelihood, it will take a
massive threat to this country. The sex offender logic could
encompass almost any dangerous person, but no other group of
people is as frightening and hated. Black and Hispanic gang
members are perhaps the group most at risk, but they do not seem
to be perceived as undeterrable. Future changes in the three key
variables cannot be ruled out and could lead to mission creep, but

.usdoj.gov/Publications/e060810142Gang-book-web.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/72JG-VG3E (last visited Aug. 22, 2014).
205. Cf. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747,
747 (2011) (discussing “pluralism anxiety”).
206. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding that the
Defense of Marriage Act violated the Equal Protection Clause).
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such changes do not appear imminent. Mission creep does not
seem likely.
Importantly, this Article examines just the tip of an iceberg:
scenarios in which the government openly declares that it will
indefinitely incarcerate people solely because they are deemed
dangerous. That is just a small part of the “preventive state,” which
manifests itself in many ways and is growing.207 With the
exception of quarantine and mental-illness civil commitment, open
preventive detention has recently expanded in existing areas and
entered new ones.208 Immigration and criminal pre-trial
proceedings are two important areas where overt “short-term”
detentions have grown dramatically. This would be cause for alarm
even without terrorism and sex offender detentions. And the rise of
prevention has many more subtle implications. Guantanamo Bay
and sexual predator detentions make headlines, but the growing
threats to civil liberties lurk beneath the surface.
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